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 Security and Development? 
A Story about Petty Crime, the Petty State and its Petty Law 
 
 
 ÀSeguridad y Desarrollo? 
Una Historia sobre los Pequeos Criminales,  
el Pequeo Estado y sus Pequeas Leyes 
 
 
Lina Buchely and Luis Eslava1 
 
 
Ours, after all, is an epoch Ð if not the first, then certainly the latest 
Ð in which law-making, law-breaking and law-
enforcement are especially critical registers in which 
societies construct, contest, and confront truths about 
themselves.  
 




In this article we engage with the promises and limits of the ÔSecurity and 
DevelopmentÕ discourse. Using Cali as our case study, we show how initiatives 
associated with this discourse, instead of helping states move beyond insecurity, 
exclusion and low levels of development by strengthening social relations, 
official institutions and legal frameworks, end up producing, instead, a particular 
set of precarious institutional and human arrangements. We characterise this 
precarity as moving in the realm of ÔpettinessÕ: a characterisation that for us 
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suggests both the marginal kinds of solutions that ultimately form the core of 
Security and Development, and the flimsiness that has come to mark those 
institutional and human arrangements resulting from it. The result is a resilient 




En este artculo discutimos las promesas y los lmites del discurso de 'Seguridad 
y Desarrollo'. Usando Cali como nuestro estudio de caso, mostramos cmo las 
iniciativas asociadas con este discurso terminan produciendo un conjunto 
particular de arreglos institucionales y humanos precarios, en lugar de ayudar a 
los estados a superar la inseguridad, la exclusin y los bajos niveles de 
desarrollo. En este artculo caracterizamos esta precariedad en trminos de 
"pequeez": una caracterizacin que para nosotros sugiere tanto los tipos 
marginales de soluciones que en ltima instancia forman el ncleo de la 
Seguridad y el Desarrollo, como la fragilidad que han marcado los arreglos 
institucionales y humanos que resultan de eso. El resultado es una limitacin 














In this article, we explore the dramas underpinning and unleashed by the current 
encounter between ÔsecurityÕ and ÔdevelopmentÕ in the Global South. This is an 
encounter that has come to be conceptualised under the rubric of ÔSecurity and 
DevelopmentÕ: a powerful and rapidly expanding set of discourses and practices which, 
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borrowing from decades of interpenetration between security concerns and the 
international development project during the Cold War, and later during the age of 
international humanitarian interventions in the 1990s, has come to occupy a crucial 
place in policy-making debates in our era of a seemingly never-ending war on terror. As 
former World Bank president Robert Zoellick (2007Ð12) put it in his foreword to the 
2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development, the aim is to 
bring Ôsecurity and development together to put down roots deep enough to break the 
cycles of fragility and conflictÕ in countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, 
Southern Sudan, and many Ôother lands of conflict or broken statesÕ (Zoellick 2017). 
According to Zoellick, Ôrecurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty, and violenceÕ 
have Ôplagued these landsÕ, generating domestic and international insecurity and low 
levels of development. Security and Development discussions and policies have aimed, 
in this context, to replace Ôfragility and conflictÕ with stronger state institutions, lasting 
social inclusion and long-term economic outcomes Ð in ZoellickÕs words, Ôto move 
beyond conflict and fragility and secure developmentÕ.2 
 
In this article we engage with the tensions that have accompanied this project and show 
how, instead of Ômoving beyondÕ insecurity, exclusion and low development levels by 
strengthening social relations, official institutions and legal frameworks, discussions 
and associated technologies of Security and Development have produced a particular set 
of precarious institutional and human arrangements. We characterise this precarity here 
as moving in the realm of ÔpettinessÕ. For us this pettiness does not relate to ÔpickinessÕ 
or ÔnastinessÕ, but to ÔtrivialityÕ and ÔsmallnessÕ. Pettiness suggests both the marginal 
kind of solutions that ultimately form the core of Security and Development, and the 
smallness or flimsiness that has come to mark the institutional and human arrangements 
resulting from it. Pettiness thus signals the manner in which Security and Development 
has ended up supporting second-class fixes which produce second-class subjects and 
second-class visions of the state and law, instead of robust, structural solutions able to 
solve global problems related to human and institutional instability, and their 
subsequent expression, for example, in urban violence. We are deeply concerned about 
these ÔpettyÕ arrangements because they are deployed in contexts that have already 
suffered countless waves of failed developmental interventions (places that have been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 On the merging of security and development, see e.g.: Duffield (2014). 
Forthcoming. Revista de Estudios Sociales 
! 4 
systematically ÔunderdevelopedÕ to use the classical language of Andre Gunter Frank 
(1966) and Walter Rodney (1972)), and because they are expanding, as a result, a world 
already organised around the late liberal management of vulnerability. As Povinelli has 
argued, today vulnerability is not something that necessarily needs to be solved but to 
be administered. In this context, social relations are pacified via inclusion exercises 
without proper entitlements, and the securitization of social life without actual security. 
In this process a particular universe is being sedimented, one marked by orchestrated 
forms of abandonment (Povinelli 2011). 
 
The situation we have just described is neatly illustrated by the large amount of 
attention that is currently being paid to Ôpetty crimeÕ and Ôpetty criminalsÕ with the 
arrival of the Security and Development agenda in cities in the Global South Ð the final 
frontier when it comes to breaking Ôthe cycles of fragility and conflictÕ mentioned by 
Zoellick above. To fully grasp the implications of this phenomenon and its products Ð 
what we call here Ôpetty subjectsÕ, Ôpetty statesÕ and Ôpetty lawsÕ Ð we need to engage, 
however, with the ground-level motions of Security and Development. In order to 
achieve this, we will take the reader on an ethnographic visit to Cali, a city of around 4 
million people in south-eastern Colombia. In Cali, as in many other cities in the Global 
South today, what Jean and John Comaroff would call Ôlaw-making, law-breaking and 
law-enforcementÕ have become critical registers for witnessing the kind of world 
resulting from the current international obsession with ÔsecurityÕ and ÔdevelopmentÕ 
(Comaroff & Comaroff 2016, xii).3 
 
In order to organise our analysis, the following sections introduce Cali and our main 
problem in more detail (Section I), and we then describe how cities and their residents 
have become key spaces which the Security and Development discourse seeks to 
transform (Section II). After that, we examine in depth one of the many programs that 
are currently targeting petty criminals and vulnerable youth in Cali (Section III). This 
program shares three basic characteristics with many similar exercises taking place in 
the city and other locales across the Global South: (i) it is based on the idea of inclusion 
through Ôneo-developmental punitive technologiesÕ (as we define them), which combine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Our approach in this article builds on, and aims to contribute to, a rich and diverse body of literature on 
the anthropology of the state, law and the global order, now intersecting question of security. See for 
example, as overviews of this literature: Sharma and Gupta (2006); Pottage and Mundy (2004); Goldstein 
(2010). 
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conditional services and psychosocial strategies to bring young people involved or at 
risk of getting involved in crime into the cityÕs official life; (ii) it uses public-private 
associations and normative frameworks to join and strengthen forces in the fight against 
crime; and (iii), its solutions, which operate in a neoliberal context of ongoing 
budgetary restrictions and late capitalist aspirations, are skewed towards individual 
ÔhealingÕ, rather than collective or structural causal factors. Thanks to these 
characteristics, the programme that we examine below and similar programs give rise to 
an expansive scenario of intervention, a scenario that saturates the lives of their young 
ÔclientsÕ Ð and their ÔprovidersÕ Ð with the presence of the state and its laws. But as we 
will see, the state that transpires and is constituted through these programmes is an 
entity which, regardless of good will or ideas, is always limited, always ÔpettyÕ. So what 
we have is a state, and of course a set of laws, that is never sufficiently robust to solve 
the problems at hand but that always seems to be present regardless. Security and 
Development interventions then reproduce arrangements that despite being second-class 
in nature still carry enormous weight in terms of forming a particular kind of social 
order. Petty criminals and the (petty) state and its (petty) law mutually create and 
recreate themselves without ever definitively eradicating their liminality or the 
insecurities that unite them, a point that we expand on in the last section (Section IV).  
 
As we will show, our analysis here leads us to suggest not that ÔrobustnessÕ or a 
structural approach not yet taken offer solutions that will finally make the Security and 
Development discourse effective. These are often not only unavailable options in the 
current environment but also risky paths that could further escalate the violence that 
already underpins the state and the universe that comes with it and through it.4 As a 
result we invite the reader to appreciate, instead, the profound constrains that 
characterise life in the expanded South today. These constraints, and the agonies 
unleashed by them, are the very predicaments of todayÕs peripheries; realities that 





4 See especially on the limited character of policies associated to ÔSecurity and DevelopmentÕ, Chandler 
(2007, 2015). 
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I.! Our city, our problem 
 
Like many other rapidly globalising cities in the Global South, and despite huge 
advances in recent years, Cali remains one of the most conflict-ridden cities in 
Colombia and in the world. According to a recent report by the Citizen Council for 
Public Security and Criminal Justice (2017), Cali is the worldÕs 21st most violent city in 
terms of homicides per capita.5 Parallel to this, youth gangs, high numbers of teenage 
deaths, and the proliferation of so-called oficinas (neighborhood-based criminal 
organizations) constitute the common elements of the image Cali presents to Colombia 
and to the world. In contrast to this image of violence and disorder, however, todayÕs 
Cali also speaks of positive and different visions for the city. Stories of financial 
success, the eradication of organized crime and big violence linked to drug trafficking, 
its ethnic multiplicity, the dynamism of its public administration, a philanthropic ethos 
rooted in local companies, a large young population and a broad range of artistic events6 
counterbalance CaliÕs stories of violence. 
 
The result of this combination of positive and negative elements is a Cali flooded with 
energy, aspirations and intense contradictions: three elements that characterise, again 
like in many other parts of the Global South, the cityÕs young people and that place 
them at the center of public attention. CaliÕs youth are its present and future, but they 
engender the problems that the city has not been able to overcome Ð in particular those 
involved in or at risk of becoming involved in crime. This situation is comparable to 
that of many other Latin American cities and beyond, where young people involved in 
or at risk of engaging in criminal activities have become the protagonists of an urban 
drama associated with insecurity.7 It is a drama that speaks of the effects of late 
capitalist modernity in the Global South, particularly in countries like Colombia which, 
despite declaring themselves at ÔpeaceÕ or in Ôpost-conflictÕ, always seem stuck in a 
cycle of economic volatility, unemployment and social and political unrest. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice (Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad 
Pblica y la Justicia Penal) (CCSP JP) is a non-governmental organisation established in Mexico in 2002 
and dedicated to the monitoring of conflict globally.  
6 These include the World Salsa Festival, the Petronio çlvarez Music Festival, and Ajazzgo, among many 
others. 
7 There is a large body of literature on the association between security and youth violence in Latin 
America. See e.g.: in the case of Argentina, Medan (2012, 2014) and Raggio and Sabarots (2012) and in 
the case of Brazil, Ursin (2012), Gough and Franch (2006). 
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Young people in Cali, and their relationship to this drama of insecurity, are also marked, 
again as in many other places, by strong racial discrimination. Cali is two hours away 
from the impoverished Pacific Coast of Colombia, which has encouraged mass 
migration Ð mainly of people of African descent Ð away from this area to the city. Some 
26.5% of CaliÕs urban population identify as black, and of all Colombian cities, it is 
home to the greatest proportion of Afro-Colombians. Tellingly, some 25% of this 
population is subject to the effects of inequality and extreme spatial and economic 
exclusion (Rodrguez, Alfonso & Cavelier 2009). The same happens with 
unemployment, where the highest levels tend to occur in the Afro-Colombian 
population and their territories (Uribe-Castro, Holgun & Ayala 2016). This is 
especially evident in the Aguablanca Ð a large territory in the cityÕs east that emerged in 
the 1970s due to internal displacement caused by ColombiaÕs armed conflict (Urrea 
1997). Officially encompassing, what is called according to the cityÕs language 
administrative distribution, Comunas 13, 14, 15 and 21, Aguablanca is home to the 
largest proportion of displaced Afro-Colombians in the country. Half of CaliÕs 
homicides are committed in this area, most of them involving young men aged between 
14 and 21 (Cali cmo vamos 2015). 
 
As mentioned, however, Cali is no longer perceived as a place of great crime. The city 
used to be the headquarters of one of the big drug cartels operating during the 1980s and 
1990s, which is when it was catapulted into the global imaginary, together with 
Medellin, as one of the main poles of the Colombian mafia Ð an image that continues to 
be lucratively recycled in TV series such as NetflixÕs Narcos (2015Ðongoing). TodayÕs 
Cali is seen differently. As ColombiaÕs post-conflict status sets in, Cali is now perceived 
as being on the path to ÔdevelopmentÕ, if only it could solve the problems of its low-
grade yet endemic, racialized, and difficult to control insecurity. TodayÕs Cali is, 
according to this narrative, a city affected by what has long been known in 
criminological circles as Ôpetty crimeÕ, including phone theft, micro-trafficking of 
illegal drugs, micro-extortion, and occasional murders, committed mainly (according to 
this narrative) by young Afro-Colombian men (Fig. 1.).8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 In Colombia, according to the first report (2012) of the Observatory of Childhood Welfare from 
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), since 2010 the percentage of youths entered into the 
penal system had increased at an approximate 10% rate per year. Various laws and public policies have 
been issued in response to this increasingly high percentage of youths involved in criminal conflicts. The 
CONPES Document 173 of 2014 and Law 1622 of 2013 are the most recent; these laws and public 




Fig. 1. Mobile thief captured by local police in Cali (HSBNoticias.com, 24 
Sep. 2015).  
 
In this context, Cali has become a privileged place in which to test the new range of 
discourses and developmental practices associated with security, which we began to 
describe in the introduction. Known by the general label of Security and Development, 
these new practices and discourses are part of a recent Ôknow-howÕ and a new chapter of 
global governance which aims to achieve public security, or what is also known as 
Ôcitizenship securityÕ, in cities like Cali.9 Interestingly in Cali, as we will see, the 
decision of the city's administrative organs to embrace the Security and Development 
agenda has not been accompanied by the expansion of the typical Ôfirm handÕ associated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
policies pursue the goal of guaranteeing young peopleÕs socio-economic rights so they can find legal 
alternatives. The statutory law defines ÔyouthÕ as everyone between 14 and 28 years old.  
9 According to the Colombian National Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security, in Spanish, Poltica 
Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia. DNP, Direccin de Justicia, Seguridad y Gobierno 
(2011), citizen security is understood as Ô[t]he universal protection of citizens from crimes and 
contraventions that affect their dignity, their personal safety and that of their goods, and in terms of their 
fear of insecurity. Cohabitation involves the promotion of the citizensÕ attachment and adhesion to a 
citizen culture based on a respect for the law, for others, and for basic norms of behavior and social 
coexistenceÕ, p. 1. 
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with law and order responses to crime.10 Such an approach, while still present and 
evidenced through the large proportion of the cityÕs resources still dedicated to the 
salaries of police units and the improvement of the cityÕs police infrastructure, has come 
be seen as not only as too costly both politically and financially but also as not 
sufficient to tackle the problem of insecurity.11 So what has emerged in recent years is a 
range of new policing and surveillance technologies and, perhaps more importantly for 
us here, a broad array of new developmental practices: practices that aim to create a 
more robust state presence in the city via more responsive, economically efficient and 
flexible policies and norms. These new policies and norms have become the platform 
for implementing social intervention measures which aim to ÔincludeÕ the cityÕs youth Ð 
involved or at risk of being involved in crime Ð in the cityÕs official dynamics. Trying to 
use the available yet always insufficient public resources to their maximum extent, these 
more affordable developmental practices strive to generate security and development by 
including the cityÕs peripheral subjects in its official life, generating that sense of safety 
which international institutions, local and foreign investors, and residents Ð both rich 
and poor Ð are demanding of the local administration (Fig. 2).12 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 CaliÕs security expending went from 60% to 20% in 20 years. One of our informants explained this 
changed in the following way: ÒIn the 90s everything was spent on tombaÓ (slang for police). (Interview 
with public servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018). 
11 In December 2017, Cali had 6500 police officers. With an annual budget close to three billon COP 
(1,000 million USD), the city invests in its police force 21,000 million COP (7.3 million USD). Although 
much smaller in terms of investment, the youth support programs that we analyse here have started to 
received significant resources. In 2017, these programmes received 5,000 million pesos (more than 1.7 
million USD) Ð an amount that was reduce by 30% in 2018 (Interview with public servant, Town Hall, 
09/03/2018). 
12 On the clamour for ÔsecurityÕ by both the rich and the poor, and the connection of this phenomenon to 
the broader neoliberal turn in the South and the emergence of a Ôright to securityÕ, see especially: 
Goldstein (2011). See also on the securitization of social relations: Neocleous (2014). 
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Fig. 2. CaliÕs mayor, Maurice Armitage, congratulating a young man who 
benefited from the Youth without Borders programme (Jvenes sin 
Fronteras), one of the schemes created by the local administration to 
ÔintegrateÕ young people involved in gangs into the cityÕs formal life. 
Photo included in the official brochure of the programme (2016). 
 
The new Security and Development practices just described rely on what we call Ôneo-
developmental punitive technologiesÕ. These technologies often combine conditional 
services with psychosocial attention offered to vulnerable young people as a tool of 
crime dissuasion and social inclusion. As we show in the next sections, these 
Ôconditional servicesÕ materialize in the form of employment, sport, education and more 
general care services delivered by public and private institutions and community police 
officers in partnership with local actors and the local administration, on condition of 
behavioural change on the part of their young recipients. These conditional services 
represent a brave attempt to return to pre-neoliberal times in which welfare, in particular 
full employment, or the aspiration to generate it, constituted the organisational force 
behind state action and the construction of citizenship (Esping-Andersen 1999). 
However, these benefits and employment options are now not only ÔconditionalÕ but 
also very limited. This is due to the national and local governmentÕs financial 
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constraints and, more generally, the larger restrictions imposed on any initiative of 
meaningful social inclusion derived from our inequality-producing global order.13 
 
In this context, the use of ÔpsychosocialÕ discourses, ideas and interventions have 
massively proliferated through these programmes. Departing from an understanding that 
individuals need to be considered products as much as makers of their societies, the 
psychosocial is brought into these programmes to help young people overcome what is 
seen as their lack of sociability and self-esteem, and to assimilate the community values 
required by (formal and legal) city life.14 Delivered on occasions by professionals, but 
more generally just employed as the underpinning rationale of these programmes, this 
approach has come to be considered, therefore, not only as a more efficient avenue to 
reach out to young people but also as an effort to help them rebuild their lives based on 
their ÔindividualÕ psychological circumstances and family backgrounds. Thus its 
purpose is to reconstruct the selves of young people and, through this, make them 
socially and economically functional. In the precarious context that characterises Cali, 
and in the larger neoliberal environment in which the city exists, this psychosocial 
approach often ends up occupying a large proportion of these neo-developmental 
punitive technologies, emphasising with this emotional and individual-based solutions 
more than structural changes. In doing so they have come to replicate in Cali the issues 
raised by larger critiques of this psychosocial turn in social policies and towards 
individualization, subjectification, psychologisation and the therapeutic in social life.15 
According to Stenner and Taylor, for example, this excessive focus on the individual 
has come to confuse Ôwhat might be distinctive about the psychic and the socialÕ, 
making this approach unable Ôto address the issues of redistribution, equality and 
inequality, justice and injustice that pertain to societal level structures and processesÕ 
(Stenner and Taylor 2008). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The literature on the difficulties of enacting alternative development models and putting into practice 
meaningful social inclusion programmes is vast. Three pieces that outline the contours of this problem 
and its effects both in the North and South, particularly in terms of global structural limits to the 
peripheries of the world, jobless growth patterns and long patterns of material inequality, are Fischer 
(2015), Murray Li (2013) and Johnson (2015). 
14 See on the assumptions and objectives of psychosocial approaches: Frosh (2003). 
15 These critiques of individualization and subjectification go back to Beck (1992) and to Foucault via 
Rose (1989). See on the turn to individualization, subjectification and behavioural base solutions and 
approaches: Parker (2007), Madsen (2014). See especially in the development context: Klein (2017). 
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Against this backdrop, and as we shall see in more detail below, active petty criminals 
or those at risk of falling into a life in crime in Cali are actually being produced through 
these neo-developmental punitive technologies. At the same time, the state, in 
responding to its petty criminals Ð in its obsession with controlling and helping them, 
with all of its ambitions and limitations, through these new methods Ð is reconstructing 
itself to suit this period of late capitalist modernity. The state produces CaliÕs petty 
criminals and CaliÕs petty criminals produce the state, in a strange interaction that is 
especially visible when considering the state through classic lenses.16 The state, in this 
way, does not only pursue the petty criminal, and the petty criminal does not only run 
away from the state and its monopoly of violence; the Ôpetty criminalÕ also emerges 
when he receives, enjoys or waits for the state, and the state Ð a Ôpetty stateÕ Ð is 
produced when it tries to respond, with its multiple constraints and new normative 
expressions or Ôpetty lawsÕ, to the reality of young criminals in Cali.  
 
This constitutive intimacy, plagued by inconsistencies and gaps, is materialized through 
the abovementioned neo-developmental punitive technologies. These technologies 
respond to and create subjects, a state and laws marked by what we have described as 
ÔmarginalityÕ, ÔsmallnessÕ, and being Ôsecond-classÕ. For us, this ÔpettinessÕ 
demonstrates how, in precarious contexts of developmental experimentation and in the 
face of economic imperatives, what ends up being perpetually reproduced are 
disciplined evanescent bodies: bodies in which battles around security and development 
Ð which are in reality battles around small crimes committed by vulnerable, out of 
school, unemployed and poor young people Ð generate transitional forms of existence. 
These forms of existence oscillate constantly between macro-visibility and absence, 
occasional satisfaction of needs and hunger, periods of relative peace and violence. This 
liminality, or this particular form of ÔabandonmentÕ, to keep using the conceptual 
repertoire we have begun to build here, speaks again of a sociality where the lack of 
structural solutions is repeatedly superseded by sporadic benefits and, most of all, 
expanding discourses of affection that do not have necessarily a material traction in 
terms of satisfying pressing needs. All this feeds a reality already full of drama. A 
reality in which young people are the object of public policies yet continue to declare, 
through an Adidas trademark shaved on their heads, for example, that only the market 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See for example on the state as a social relation, Jessop (2016).  
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effectively includes them (Fig. 3); in which civil servants and community actors 
dedicate their lives to creating state institutions but struggle to the point of weeping 
when they reflect on the stateÕs perennial insufficiency (Fig. 4); and, more generally, in 
which a middle-class responding to the popular image of Cali as an unsafe city screams 
out for a strong state while putting into operation new and more sophisticated schemes 
of private security that increasingly confine them to their apartment blocks and gated 
communities (Fig. 5).17  
 
 
Fig. 3. Chico Caleo with Adidas trademark shaved in his hair. Courtesy 
of a community leader. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See e.g.: Focas & Rincn (2016).  
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Fig. 4. Delivery of basic staples, part of a program of early intervention 
into petty crime in Cali. Courtesy of a community leader. 
 
 




Fig. 5. Private security in action in a Cali. Photo by the authors. 
 
II.! A global agenda 
 
Before we get further into the intricacies of petty crime and its management in Cali, we 
want to flesh out in more detail the centrality of cities in the Security and Development 
agenda. The starting point of this side of our story concerns the state-building efforts 
that consistently lie behind attempts to solve the historically assumed precariousness of 
the postcolonial South. This was initially characterized by the establishment of 
centralized states, and local elitesÕ drive to control, as much as possible, internal 
markets and the processes of internal industrialization. This centralism was a clear 
expression of the developmental energies that accompanied state formation in the 
South, beginning with the wars of independence in the first half of the 19th century in 
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Latin America, and during the decolonization period from the end of the Second World 
War to the mid-1970s in Africa, Asia and the Pacific (Eslava forthcoming). With the 
advent of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, however, the idea of decentralizing 
Southern states emerged as a new rationale to think about state-building and 
development. Cities then began to be positioned as the new centers of action, control 
and management. 
 
The call to decentralize states Ð which became known as Ôfragile statesÕ during this time 
Ð unleashed a re-reading of cities as the new centers of capital accumulation and as 
nodes of more flexible and dynamic governance strategies; in other words, places more 
able to generate exchanges between the local and the global. Cities, in this process of 
Ôpetty-ingÕ the state, surfaced in international and national policies and laws as the ideal 
jurisdictions in which to make not only the domestic but also the global order more 
present, intimate, close, intelligent, economically proficient and safe (Eslava 2015). 
 
Cali, again, is a revealing location from which to appreciate the operation and limits of 
this reallocation of the developmental project, in particular the security project, from 
national institutions to local municipalities.18 In Cali the arrival of decentralization has 
been framed by the cityÕs many achievements but also by its unequal economic growth 
and a population drastically fragmented in terms of race, employment options, location 
in the city, and enjoyment of urban infrastructure. In this context small crime has 
emerged as a form of life, in particular for the cityÕs marginalized youth, and thus as a 
key local developmental concern. For the local administration, young people involved 
in this type of activity are, however, slippery subjects trapped by poverty, colour, 
dialect, chronic unemployment, early desertion from school, teenage pregnancy, 
addictions and, more often than not, criminal records linked to minor crimes from a 
very early age (Cisalva 2017). To regulate and help them, however, the city Ð a city 
trapped in a neoliberal world, as we have suggested Ð only has limited resources or, 
perhaps more precisely, the local government is only politically able to mobilize a small 
fraction of the cityÕs budget for these matters. The result is that the local administration 
cannot do much to substantially solve the problems of petty crime yet, due to the strong 
call to Security and Development, cannot ignore the problem either. What has come out 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 On the shift of the security agenda from the national to the urban level, see: Pontes Nogueira (2017). 
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of all of this, therefore, is that the cityÕs government finds itself experimenting with 
budget-compliant programmes that try to negotiate the complex realities of the youth 
involved in petty crime: subjects who continually slip through the net of services 
offered by the public administration, which continues to insist on reaching and 
controlling them.19 
 
This reality is but a reflection of more extensive processes related to international 
efforts to ensure security in a Global South generally characterized by great socio-
spatial and economic segregation, fragile economies, and a middle class panicked by the 
possibility that their goods Ð their only stronghold Ð may be stolen, or that in a moment 
of confusion, during a theft, they may be injured or killed.20 Concerns for urban crime 
and safety have become, for these reasons, a powerful argument for advancing new 
models of governance that combine ÔhardÕ and increasingly ÔsofterÕ Ð in the sense of 
affordable and thus experimental Ð forms of social control in Global South cities. As 
always, development, this time at the local level, justifies making security concerns, and 
the application of these new policy prescriptions, a pressing matter. 
 
Evidence of this new face of global governance based on the connection between 
(in)security and development and on the importance of acting creatively from a local 
sphere is enormous. For example, in 2011 the World Bank published its report Violence 
in the City: Understanding and Supporting Community responses to Urban Violence,21 
which clearly argues that urban violence must be urgently tackled by combining public 
and community crime prevention strategies with development programs (Rodgers 
1999).22 These concerns about urban violence and a need for local developmental 
actions have been reflected in a transformation in ColombiaÕs national criminal law 
over the past decade, aiming to expedite criminal processes and make them more 
responsive to local conditions, and in an extraordinary reallocation of budgetary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 On experimentalism and the New Developmental State, particularly in the case of Latin America, see: 
Trubek (2013), Alviar (2013).  
20 See e.g.: Winton (2005); Santilln & Varea (2014).  
21 A key document that preceded this report is Youth Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Costs, Causes, and Interventions, published in 1999 by the World Bank. See also: World Bank (2005); 
World Bank (2014); Chioda (2017).  
22 This World Bank report studies, without being exhaustive, the ways in which urban residents deal with 
violence or the threat of violence in their daily lives (pp. 2Ð3). In this context, it develops an exploration 
of the social drivers of violence and their impact on social relations in order to inform the design of 
policies and programs for the prevention of insecurity (p. 20). The text ends by suggesting analytical 
frameworks to understand the communityÕs capacity to prevent crime (p. 25).  
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resources towards local security concerns (CEJ & Embajada Britnica 2011). In 2013, 
for example, Ôcitizenship securityÕ became the main focus of national expending for the 
first time in the countryÕs history (Urna de Cristal 2013). This change in the budgetary 
structure reflected an even broader shift in the reading of ÔsecurityÕ within the country. 
In 2011, the High Presidential Advisory Office for Coexistence and Citizen Security 
issued the National Policy on Coexistence and Citizen Security, with the objective of 
achieving peace in urban contexts. This document begins stating that, despite security 
advances in Colombia over the recent years: 
 
É threats have not disappeared and they are instead transforming, challenging 
with this the state and the democratic system. Cities are the protagonists of this 
adaptation that contributes to the existence of high levels of crime and social 
conflict, that are unacceptable for a society that is progressing towards 
developmentÉ Common crime affects the daily lives of all Colombians, 
especially the most vulnerable, and it deteriorates their quality of life by 
fostering fear and a lack of trust among citizens, stopping us from enjoying the 
rights consecrated in the Constitution. Insecurity is a multi-headed monster that 
manifests in many ways: theft, armed robbery, extortion, kidnapping and 
murder. However, it is not and should not be a permanent condition (Alta 
Consejera Presidencial para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana 2011). 
 
This turn towards the city as the site for achieving Ôcitizenship securityÕ in Colombia 
and elsewhere has been accompanied by an important additional transformation. The 
ÔcitizenryÕ, rather than the ÔnationÕ, has become the center of governmental protection. 
However, this ÔcitizenryÕ, this ÔsocietyÕ in FoucaultÕs sense, is a far from abstract entity. 
It is imagined as a collective of, above all, property holders, ready to contribute to the 
development of their cities, nations and the world, but paralyzed by the dangers on their 
streets. This reading of the citizenry is mixed, of course, with middle-class images and 
imaginaries of why cities are violent, who is violent, and how to solve the urban drama 
of insecurity.23 To sort this situation out and, in particular, to respond to the concerns 
experienced by this urban citizenry, the new security policies are unveiled, as we have 
been suggesting, as heterogeneous plans combining punitive practices with social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See e.g.: Santilln & Varea (2014).  
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intervention programs that aspire to promote security and achieve that development that 
has been always so elusive in the South.24  
 
Cali, as one of the most important and complicated cities in terms of urban violence in 
Latin America and the world, has been at the center of the Security and Development 
initiatives promoted by the World Bank and other international organizations and the 
Colombian government (OEA 2017; CCSP JP 2017; World Bank 2011). In June 2013, 
for example, CaliÕs local government hosted a high-level regional meeting, coordinated 
by the World Bank, in which mayors from all over Latin America shared their 
experiences of programs implemented to counteract the growing phenomena of urban 
insecurity. The World Bank reported the meetingÕs results in the following way:  
 
Twenty years ago, Cali was on the frontline of one of the worldÕs most 
dangerous wars. A group of drug traffickers É clashed violently with their 
enemies in Medellin.... This week, Cali received some 450 guests from around 
the continent, who came to discuss the problem of crime and violence that 
devastated this city and that now affects the entire region, from the suburbs of 
Chicago to the highways of Central AmericaÉ. For everyone at the conference, 
it was clear that citizen insecurity is a multifaceted issue that cannot be 
addressed solely by public security forces. In others words, a Ôfirm handÕ is not 
enough to resolve the problem (World Bank 2013). 
 
As we can see, this meeting concluded by confirming that traditional Ôfirm handÕ 
approaches to crime should be complimented with smarter strategies, more adapted to 
local needs and resources. This moving away from ÔfirmnessÕ in the approach to crime 
and the promotion of safety speaks of the way in which broader international discourses 
around law Ð in particular Ôthe rule of lawÕ Ð and its application have been modulated by 
developmental imperatives and their more malleable approach to social administration, 
a phenomenon expressed by the recent inclusion of ÔjusticeÕ as a measurable target in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2015).25 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See e.g.: Ibid; Raggio & Sabarots (2012); Medan (2014).  
25 See on the rule of law and development: Trubek (2006); Kennedy (2006). 
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The possibility of these new security approaches succeeding, however, is very small. 
One reason for this is the macro-economic figures of countries such as Colombia and 
their cities, including Cali. In terms of poverty, unemployment and inequality, these are 
not encouraging. The Cali Chamber of Commerce reports, for example, that the cityÕs 
socio-economic figures improved rapidly at the beginning of the 2000s but that between 
2010 and 2016 inequality and unemployment increased by almost 20% (CCC 2017). 
Meanwhile Cali continues to be, as mentioned in the introduction, one of the worldÕs 
most unsafe cities according to homicides per capita Ð a figure The Economist recently 
turned into world news (2017). Poverty, unemployment, inequality and insecurity go 
hand in hand in the city, and it seems that not much has been achieved by the changed 
approach to crime. Faced with this reality, however, the local administration has been 
strengthening its commitments to Ôcitizenship securityÕ and experimenting with newer 
policies.  
 
Following closely the suggestion for more flexible approaches suggested by the World 
Bank, the new policies that Cali has been implementing focus on the reconstruction of 
the criminal subject through the exchange of benefits combined with psychosocial 
approaches. Organised not around lawÕs usual rigidity, but through cost-effective and 
flexible exercises for integrating young criminals into the cityÕs official dynamics, these 
exercises symbolically condense two overlapping needs. On the one hand, the urgent 
need to attack the drama of insecurity because it affects the cityÕs Ôdevelopment and 
competitiveness. And, on the other, the need to direct these exercises using available 
ÔfriendlyÕ and ÔdynamicÕ mechanisms that promise to integrate young people, involved 
in crime or at risk of it, into the cityÕs productive chains, while minimizing the 
generation of new costs for the local administration Ð for example, in the form of more 
prisoners or more beneficiaries to the cityÕs social security schemes.  
 
To use this social approach as a punitive strategy has concrete effects on the 
construction of state-society relations. As we shall see in the next section, this approach 
to security Ð one that says that Ôpetty criminalsÕ should be engaged not in a traditional 
fashion but through frameworks of exchange and affective management Ð has implied a 
counter-intuitive political economic rationale: doing more while spending less. As such, 
the state is currently presented as an entity that is able to do more than it has always 
done, and that it can do so with less. This contradiction can only be resolved by leaving 
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a large part of its operation in the hands of third parties, or of the very communities and 
individuals that its plans are designed to benefit.  
 
This devolution is done through a complex Ð often convoluted Ð system of incentives 
and externalization mechanisms that take the form, for example, of social philanthropy, 
co-responsibility frameworks and, as we have suggested, individual training.26 The 
effect generated, as we will see in a moment, is of a state deeply involved in the life of 
the city, particularly in those sections that are vulnerable. This involvement is 
effectuated, however, by community civil servants or lay community actors, who serve 
as bridges to services or who are directly engaged in providing emotional care. But 
regardless of their important work, the services these actors can offer to their ÔclientsÕ 
are generally unable able to solve the root causes of the problems that they face: for 
example, systemic social exclusion, racism, multiple drug dependencies and mental 
illness. For the young people at the center of these programs, the state therefore ends up 
being always there, in their lives, neighbourhoods and houses. This presence is always 
marked, however, by the spirit of experimentation, and most importantly, by financial 
constraints. Frustrations, half-built Ôlife projectsÕ and entrenchment in defiant ways of 
life are these young peopleÕs response to a state that promises more with less.  
 
III.! A neo-developmental punitive program27 
 
The Jvenes sin Fronteras (Youth without Borders) programme illustrates the repertoire 
of efforts put into operation in Cali to include young people Ôat riskÕ of entering or 
already involved in petty criminal networks into the official life of the city. As we will 
see in this section, this program reveals the kind of expansionism, saturation and final 
lack of robustness that we have argued has accompanied the co-constitution, under the 
banner of Security and Development, of Ôpetty criminalsÕ, a Ôpetty stateÕ and Ôpetty 
lawsÕ in Cali in recent years.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 For references about public-private co-responsibility in security programs, and about the link between 
development and psychological/psychosocial exercises, see: Akhtar (2015); Haapasalo (2000); Siennick 
(2011); Tufr (2010).  
27 We reviewed seven programs in depth and chose to focus on Jvenes sin fronteras in this article. In all 
the programs that we reviewed, the elements that we have pointed out as characteristics of these 
initiatives are present, but in Jvenes sin fronteras they present themselves with a special sharpness. This 
over-supply of programs with a focus on youth can be seen as a further evidence of our argument. 
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Jvenes sin Fronteras is one of the initiatives brought by mayor Maurice Armitage into 
the city during his tenure (2016-2019). A well-known industrialist from the region, with 
a long history of philanthropic involvement in social projects, and a newcomer to 
official politics in his senior years, Armitage made a broad commitment to Ôhuman 
developmentÕ in his Government Plan, which he understood in terms of increasing local 
productivity and ameliorating unemployment, inequality, poverty and, key for our 
discussion here, insecurity (Armitage 2016).28 In ArmitageÕs own words, one of his 
main priorities as mayor was to break what he identifies as the Ôvicious circle of 
poverty, violence and insecurityÕ (Armitage 2016). In order to tackle the problem of 
crime, in particular criminal activities involving youth, Armitage proposed an approach 
heavily grounded in combining a modernization of the local police force with the social, 
economic and affective inclusion of this young population with the help of the 
community and private actors. He described his approach to security as ÔProposals for a 
Safe, Pacific and Reconciled CaliÕ (Armitage 2016). 
 
Following the broad turn towards Security and Development, Armitage generated for 
his three years in government a series of programmes combining classic concerns linked 
to employment, recreation, education and care with conditional and pedagogical 
exercises geared towards generating, what is now called in Cali, the Ôsocio-productive 
reintegrationÕ of petty criminals (Armitage 2016). The objective of these programmes 
was, in the language of ArmitageÕs Government Plan: 
 
To halt the cycle of criminal renewal in the city whereby the gang leadership is 
replenished by climbing younger members, by offering these aspiring leaders 
waiting in the queue opportunities to rebuild their life projects based on the 
generation of formal income and the unlearning [desaprendizaje] of violence, 
their emotional healing [sanacin emocional], and the restoration of their family, 
neighbourhood and community connections (Armitage 2016). 
 
Working within these parameters, the local administration created the Jvenes sin 
Fronteras programme Ð a name that makes reference to the ÔbordersÕ (fronteras) set up 
by criminal gangs within neighbourhoods in order to mark their territories. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28ArmitageÕs Government Plan became CaliÕs Local Development Plan (Cali Progresses with You) 
through the Acuerdo No. 0396/2016. 
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Administered by Cisalva, a multiple-award-winning research center dedicated to the 
study of urban crime and violence that belongs to Universidad del Valle (the largest and 
most important university in the city),29 and run in partnership with the Integrated 
Management of Gangs Scheme which operates under the Preventative Policing Unit of 
CaliÕs Metropolitan Police Department (Polica Metropolitana de Cali 2016), this 
programme works through ÔeducadoresÕ (ÔdocentsÕ) and ÔenlacesÕ (ÔlinksÕ) living in 
neighbourhoods identified on the basis of their criminal profile. Through these 
educadores, who are often professional social workers, and enlaces, former members of 
gangs from these areas, the local administrationÕs objective is to get into contact with 
vulnerable young people in order to provide conditional opportunities in education, 
sport and work, and psychosocial help. The idea behind working with educadores and 
enlaces, living and interacting directly with young people on their territory and on a 
sustained basis, is to establish the needed rapport with vulnerable youth, and thanks to 
the professional skills of educadores or the backgrounds of enlaces, to transform their 
life patterns.30 According to CisalvaÕs official description, this is a strategy of Ôsocial 
interventionÕ that enables youth belonging to gangs and located in critical 
neighbourhoods across the city Ôto have a new horizon in life.Õ In this way, Ôit is a 
project to set in motion the restitution of rights to these young people, involving 
psychosocial attention and health services, re-inclusion in the formal education system, 
work options, job training, and a selection of cultural and sport programmesÕ (Cisalva 
2016). 
 
With this larger objective as a background, what each educador and enlace does on a 
daily basis is to work closely with a group of around 10 to 25 young people from the 
area where they are located, overseeing their individual and collective development 
while helping them gain access to the education, sport and employment opportunities 
offered by Jvenes sin Fronteras. Docents and enlaces also try to ensure that the young 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Cisalva stands for the Instituto de Investigacin y Desarrollo en Prevencin de la Violenciay 
Promocin de la Convivencia Social, and operates under Universidad del Valle. Created in 1995, the 
institute was established in light of the local administrationÕs interest to understand and better respond to 
the crime in the city. The initial impulse for the centre came from the cityÕs then mayor, Mauricio 
Guerrero, known for applying epidemiological theories to the problem of violence and convinced that the 
cityÕs gangs could be attacked in the same way Ôone can attack a virusÕ (Interview with civil servant 2, 
19/04/2017). Over the years, Cisalva has supported the security policies of the local administration, a 
collaboration that was expanded and further integrated into broader security policies during the 
ArmitageÕs administration. See especially: http://cisalva.univalle.edu.co/index.php/el-instituto/historia  
30 (Interview with civil servant 2, 19/04/2017). 
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people under their supervision are enrolled in the public health system and that their 
official documents are in order Ð for example, that they have an official ID, which in 
Colombia is required for all kinds of transactions, including applying for jobs.  
 
The educational options offered through Jvenes sin Fronteras are aimed at helping 
young people finish primary and secondary school and then access technical training. 
The sport options are focused on helping those with relevant talents get into one of the 
professional sport training centres run by the local administration. In terms of 
employment options, on the other hand, the programme works a bit differently. Under 
the direct control of the mayorÕs office, the city created 2,000 jobs exclusively dedicated 
to this programme. In order for young people to access one of these jobs, they need to 
complete a basic training and, if they succeed within this training, they can apply for a 
position.31 So far the jobs created by the local administration for the programme have 
been primarily manual in nature (for example, working in recycling and solid waste 
management projects and manually eradicating invasive species like African snails and 
cutter ants); or directing crowds and regulating queues in the stations of the public 
transport system (known as MIO). As compensation for this work, young people receive 
a salary of around $250 USD per month. Crucially for our analysis, this idea of offering 
actual jobs as part of the Jvenes sin Fronteras programme responds to both an 
emerging consensus within the local administration on the limitations of only offering 
abstract ÔinstructionÕ on how vulnerable youths should reconstruct their personal and 
productive lives, and to the message that consistently comes from these young people 
targeted by the programme: Ôwhat we need is workÕ.32  
 
Education, sports and work opportunities are not, however, the sole avenue through 
which young people are steered into new lifestyles. As the description of the 
programme above makes clear, these paths for including young people in the official 
dynamics of the city are always accompanied by psychosocial support. This takes the 
form of workshops provided by professionals (i.e., psychologists and counsellors) 
linked to the programme, who use, for example, craftwork to help young people to work 
through their emotional gaps, in particular in terms of lack of positive role models, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Jvenes sin Fronteras targets young people from 12 to 28 years old. When beneficiaries are younger 
than 16 years old, the local administration enables a family member to take up the employment options 
offered through the programme.  
32 Beneficiary of program 1, 30/05/2017. 
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family support or peer-support. At the same time, a psychosocial approach more 
generally underpins the actions of all the actors administering services to young people, 
aiming at their reconstruction from the inside-out. 
 
The Jvenes sin Fronteras programmeÕs combination of conditional services and a 
psychosocial approach is personified by Intendant Jaramillo: the police commander in 
charge of the Integral Management of Gangs Scheme, and with this of juvenile violence 
in the city, including that related to barras bravas or ultras, and youth gangs. Jaramillo 
is the coordinator, on the side of the Metropolitan Police Department, of the Jvenes sin 
Fronteras programme.  
 
As coordinator, Jaramillo is in charge of allocating, through the educadores and 
enlaces, the jobs created by the local administration for the programme. This facet of 
JaramilloÕs role, as the administrator of these ÔconditionalÕ jobs and everything that 
implies in terms of assigning, not assigning or withdrawing these positions depending 
on young peopleÕs behaviour, is closely entangled with his persona and approach to 
young people and their communities. In our interviews and fieldwork outings with him 
and other police officers under his command, it was clear how this committed and 
charismatic man with gentle manners and a canny knowledge of the cityÕs ins and outs 
radiates both admiration and compassion, and how he uses this as a platform to invite 
young people to change their life patterns. Responding to this, young people from 
popular neighbourhoods in Cali like Mariano Ramos, Ciudad Crdoba, Repblica de 
Israel and Aguablanca, for example, seem to admire and trust Jaramillo, and many call 
him pap (dad). Jaramillo is, in this sense, a model of community policing: resourceful, 
close to the population, knowledgeable about peopleÕs struggles, and always ready to 
create paths for communities to live within the boundaries of the law, regardless of the 
adversities that mine their daily existence and territories. This combination of factors 
and feelings mark all interactions that take place under the Jvenes sin Fronteras 
programme.  
 
In the context just described, police officers, educadores, enlaces and the young people 
under their supervision reach such a high degree of closeness within the spaces opened 
by Jvenes sin Fronteras that the interactions and conversations between them easily 
transcend its core objectives, reaching many other aspects of their lives. For example, 
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everyone knows who is engaged in petty crime; who consumes drugs, which ones, when 
and where; what young people are going to do in the afternoon or over the weekend; 
their family history (often a history of intense violence); who has not eaten that day; 
who is in love with whom; who has a mental health problem; who is pregnant, who has 
been pregnant or has got someone pregnant; who has a death sentence over their head; 
what each young personÕs dreams are; and, what young people need to say or do in 
order to obtain things: a lunch to share or one of those education, sport or work 
opportunities offered by the local administration. 
 
Within this intimate setting, and through the process of combining conditional 
exchanges with affective instruction, the state expands and ends up covering, even 
saturating, the young peopleÕs lives through the Jvenes sin Fronteras programme.33 
According to the town hall and its officers, this expansion Ð this entrance of the state 
into the lives of young people Ð is a positive effect of the programme; an effect 
evidenced by the reduction in offences committed by those linked to the programme. 
Jvenes sin Fronteras thus shows, as made clear by town hallÕs officers, that working 
with small groups of young people and focusing on changing their collective dynamics 
and individual sense of themselves has a clear positive impact. According to one of the 
programmeÕs administrators, this face-to-face approach, accompanied by a strong 
psychosocial component, enables the administration to communicate other ethical 
patterns to young people.34 
 
Jvenes sin Fronteras speaks strongly then of the syncretism between conditional 
services and psychosocial approaches that we started to analyse in the previous sections. 
The programme operates through a plurality of actors that deliver services and 
provisions in exchange for young people moving away from criminal activities, all 
accompanied by systematic affective interventions. As we just saw, this latter strategy is 
reinforced by the close proximity to, and the assumed positive role of, enlaces, 
educadores and others involved in the programme. All these actors are conceptualised 
and present themselves as role models to young people, and all participate in offering a 
narrative about the benefits of embracing a new future by working through oneÕs 
emotions and taking advantage of the work, sport and education services offered by the 
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33 Interview with public servant, Town Hall, 09/03/2018. 
34 Interview with civil servant 2, 19/04/2017. 
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local administration. A succinct encapsulation of the mechanics behind this 
psychosocial approach can be found in the official brochure used by the local 
administration to promote Jvenes sin Fronteras:  
 
The direct interaction [between enlaces and young people in this programme] is 
based on a motivational change model, which is centred on affection and 
horizontal relationships. This model aims at the transformation of individuals 
(together with a transformation at the level of the community and the city) in 
order to guarantee a sustainable successful outcome.  
 
Holistic in its intentions and powerful in terms of scope and reach, this mixture of 
conditional services and a psychosocial approach works, as we have argued, within a 
context profoundly shaped by financial constraints and, as a result of this, is marked by 
a high degree of experimentation. As we have explained, public and private actors are 
brought together under Jvenes sin Fronteras in order to provide services to vulnerable 
youth. These actors deliver these services, however, in a moment in which the past 
rigidity of legal obligations, of both the state and individuals, have given way to a more 
flexible approach seen as necessary to bring petty criminals and youth at risk into the 
official realm. This move towards flexibility is the result of by this point sedimented 
understandings of the local administration and the state as a whole as being unable to 
embrace the costs of their full inclusion. The different actors involved in Jvenes sin 
Fronteras come together, in this way, through often very tenuous inter-administrative 
labour agreements and, although generous in comparison to previous administrations, 
still very exiguous and short-term budgetary allocations in terms of the problem they are 
meant to solve. These are limitations that derived directly from the many waves of 
restructuring and neoliberal developmental interventions suffered by the local 
administration and the Colombian state. By deregulating the labour market, restricting 
social spending and devolving many responsibilities to private or semi-private actors, 
local administrations and individuals, these restructuring processes and interventions 
have created a Ôpetty stateÕ.  
 
In one of our collective interviews with an enlace, ten of the young people under his 
supervision, and three police officers that oversaw his work, for example, the high, 
almost unbelievable, degree of intimacy and cross-support within the group, and among 
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them and the enlace and the police officers, was palpable. Also clear was the respect the 
group had for ÔtheirÕ enlace, their non-confrontational, even amicable approach towards 
the police officers, and the way they rejoiced at the possibility of securing a job or 
taking advantage of the education or sport opportunities offered by Jvenes sin 
Fronteras. 
 
All this was a remarkable achievement given that this enlace and his group were located 
in one of CaliÕs most violent neighbourhoods and that all of them, including the enlace 
himself, had grown up in the area. We perceived these strong signs of success, however, 
during an interview in the front room of the enlaceÕs house Ð a very humble 
construction, with bare floor and walls and almost no furniture except from some plastic 
chairs, but which served as the main place for the group to meet and hung out on a daily 
basis. The enlace and the group were also struggling that day to obtain something for 
lunch, a problem only resolved when the police officers present decided to buy a roast 
chicken for everyone to share, which the enlace would complement by cooking some 
rice that he had secured as a donation, a few weeks ago, from a non-governmental 
organisation.  
 
During our conversation with this group it slowly became clear that although Jvenes 
sin Fronteras has 2,000 jobs available, these are all short-term positions, they are not 
enough to fulfil the existing demand, and each opportunity is very limited Ð as 
mentioned above they consist of manual labour or helping run the cityÕs transport 
system.35 Many young people involved in the programme are also unable to access 
these jobs or they give them up quickly, due to addictions or behavioural problems, and 
the same is true for the education and sport options. Finally, we also learnt in our 
conversation with the group that, again, although the programme is very ambitious 
compared with previous initiatives and has in fact reach young criminals and youth at 
risk in their own neighbourhoods, what it offers does not necessarily correspond with 
the needs of the young people themselves. For example, it does not cover sexual and 
reproductive health or education or mental health services, access to the official 
transportation system or, more importantly, basic issues like daily meals, as we saw 
above, or housing. This last problem in particular, the issue of homelessness, was so 
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serious that the enlace we were interviewing was himself hosting one of the young 
people under his supervision, in order to shield him from further violence on the streets 
or back in his familyÕs house. 
 
Jvenes sin Fronteras thus embodies a number of features that characterise the turn 
towards neo-punitive developmental practices that have accompanied Security and 
Development discussions. The programme works through malleable managerial 
combinations and legal obligations which have the capacity to expand the stateÕs reach 
and thus its perception as omnipresent. This process has been accompanied, however, 
by shifting the fight against crime from courts and public offices to the very spaces in 
which ÔcriminalsÕ live, and to the ÔcriminalsÕ or Ôpotential criminalsÕ themselves and the 
people who work with them. This subtle but significant re-arrangement of the security 
map has brought not only the dispersion of the state and its interests and logics 
throughout the social body, but also generated a particular kind of saturation of these 
spaces and peopleÕs lives Ð one in which the essence of the state and its laws, as well as 
the subjective formations that come from it, are marked by high expectations that are 
constantly thwarted by the material limits that have come to shape the Global South.  
 
The psychosocial dimension that accompanies Jvenes sin Fronteras and similar 
programmes deepens these problems. As we have seen, Jvenes sin Fronteras aspires to 
create Ôgood peopleÕ who know the value of studying in order to one day be well-versed 
citizens, who do sports in order to generate both self-worth and collective pride, and 
who embrace the discipline of work to secure a stable economic life. The seductive 
power of this vision makes Jvenes sin Fronteras and similar programmes ideal 
vehicles for promoting the state and its ideas of security in violent urban spaces. The 
problem is that what the programme covers and what it is destined to do is, by 
definition, limited. The outcome is that this programme, like many other similar efforts, 
disseminate the idea of Ôlife projectsÕ, through the construction of Ôideal individualsÕ, 
rather than delivering the services required to realize such a promise structurally, for 
example in terms of lasting employment, housing, or a radical redistribution of power 
and resources. 
 
The combination of factors just described, then, reproduces young people who are often 
increasingly frustrated by waiting for their turn to receive the support needed to 
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materialise the benefits of living within the boundaries of the official. The idea of Ôlife 
projectsÕ is very alluring and, as confirmed during our interviews, they embrace it 
keenly. Yet the idea of a Ôlife projectÕ generates a ÔprojectionÕ of themselves that is hard 
to fulfil. These projections function, therefore, as ideal vessels: the more people commit 
to them, the more frustrated they get. The result of this process is young people who are 
conversant with the language and aspirations offered through these new neo-
developmental punitive programmes, but who entrench themselves in what is already 
available to them: for example, gangsterish outlooks and defiant manners materialised 
by, as we witnessed during our interviews, heavily pierced ears, large fake jewellery, 
bleached eyelashes or vividly dyed hair, the latter a sign that they are still Ôin the warÕ 
(en la guerra), meaning engaged in gang violence. These fashion choices, this excessive 
attention to the body and Ôla perchaÕ, as they call their clothes, offer these young 
people, as they do in many other contemporary youth subcultures, a degree of control of 
themselves and a connection with peers and the city which official narratives and other 
more cognitively defined goals are unable to (Sweetman 2001). These young people are 
subjects who, while ÔincludedÕ within the circuit of official discourses, remain in a 
liminal space between the promises of what ÔshouldÕ come from their inclusion and the 
violence that continues to mar their lives. They are petty constructions that reflect a 
petty state, with its petty laws, which promises but does not deliver. Subjects who 
remain vulnerable. Subjects whose abandonment is now managed through an intricate, 
poorly matching, matrix of services and discourses linked to the cityÕs ÔsecurityÕ and 
ÔdevelopmentÕ. 
 
IV.! Pettiness and the Predicament of Peripheries: Towards a Conclusion 
 
The precarity that characterises the young people just described is also shared by the 
educadores and enlaces who work for Jvenes sin Fronteras. As mentioned briefly in 
the last section, they tend to be hired through very tenuous contractual arrangements 
with the city and its partners. These contracts, referred to as prestacin de servicios, 
involve a labour relationship that starts and finishes within a defined period of time and 
does not involve any extra charges to the local administration, apart from those 
explicitly stated in the contracts. But this is not the only aspect of their relationship with 
the city and the state that makes their situation precarious. As representatives of the 
cityÕs administration and the state, and as direct witnesses of the limitations of the 
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programme they help to deliver, educadores and enlaces also continually agonise 
alongside the young people under their supervision.  
 
During our observations and interviews, we often saw enlaces and educadores, as well 
as public servants and private actors involved in the delivery of similar programmes, in 
tears when describing the gap between the needs of young people and what the state 
promises but does not deliver.36 In this act of crying, and in their tenuous labour 
relationships with the local administration and the state as a whole, educadores and 
enlaces further attest to that particular kind of pettiness Ð of marginality and flimsiness 
Ð that has become a key feature of the world unleashed by Security and Development in 
Cali. Their tears and tenuous labour contracts, like the hairstyles, jewellery and other 
fashion choices of the young people who work with them, denounce a world where the 
state, its law and subjects cannot be not defined by the logics of European modernity, 
governmental rigidity or emotionless rationality. What we have instead, in this South 
scenario, is a world in which the state, its law and subjects are defined by partial forms 
of abandonment, challenging clothes or accessories, and tears running down the faces of 
bureaucrats. Importantly, this ÔfragilityÕ that we can see accompanying the state here is 
not an anomaly and is not external to the state itself, for example as the World Bank 
suggests in its 2011 World Development Report that we discussed in the introduction. 
Instead, this fragility, or pettiness as we term it here, is part of the very essence of the 
state in the Global South: a unit that has been structurally adjusted in such a way that 
second-class quality has become its essence and operative ethos.  
 
Our reading of Jvenes sin Fronteras and more generally to the discourse of Security 
and Development contradicts traditional Eurocentric theories of the formation and 
functioning of the state. According to these theories, states should enjoy a number of 
features in order to confirm their existence and their presence across their territories and 
populations: they should control violence, centralise governmental apparatuses, provide 
services and construct long-lasting human and institutional structures (Weber 1976; 
Tilly 1992). These are indeed objectives present in international agendas directed to the 
Global South and embraced by its governments. This is so much the case that the 
UNDP has devised a name for this aspiration of making the state constantly and evenly 
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present across territories and populations: it is a search for Ôstate densityÕ (UNDP 
2005).37 According to the UNDP, this concept can help international and domestic 
policy makers define whether ÔstatesÕ are present or not across their geographies and 
societies, and whether governments are doing a good job or not in this regard. The 
normative assumption underpinning this and other similar initiatives is that the more 
present the state is, the more legitimate it is, the more ÔsecurityÕ and ÔdevelopmentÕ it 
fosters. According to the analysis presented here, however, even when the state makes 
itself present in the South, even when it expands and saturates the lives of its subjects 
and territories with the best intentions, it operates with a particularly thin density, and 
materialises with a particularly low calibre.  
 
Our discussion therefore complicates Weberian assumptions about the state, conceived 
as a solid, rational structure, organized on the basis of a sharp, all-encompassing and 
fully-functional universal logic. In the context of the operation of Security and 
Development discourse in Cali today, however, the state chase young people at risk and 
petty criminals in order to include them but once ÔincludedÕ their expectations and needs 
go either unheard or, even worst, they are found to be impossible to fulfil. In response to 
this situation, petty criminals, and those at risk of falling into criminal networks, 
entrench themselves in affective manoeuvrings linked to consumption and in popular 
criminal narratives that are already available to them. They cling onto that individuality 
that, as their psychosocial counselling has confirmed, is the space that they have, maybe 
the only thing that they have. Distraught by the realities of the young people that they 
work with, precariously employed by public and private institutions, and always short 
of resources to run the programs under their command, the direct representatives of the 
state who accompany these young people cry in despair as their inadequate response to 
a set of structural realities they cannot change or challenge. In all these acts, young 
people, educadores and enlaces embody a state that expands and saturates, but remains 
ÔfragileÕ.  
 
This reverting back to individual affections and emotions is important if we bear in 
mind the type of services that are provided by Security and Development programmes. 
These services always entail an element Ð often a very substantive element Ð focused on 
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emotive support and services: it is important to listen, understand, love and support 
young peopleÕs visualisation of their Ôlife projectÕ in order to overcome insecurity in the 
city and promote development. In this way the rationality of public action becomes 
geared towards questions of affection, with perhaps not enough attention to larger social 
processes. In this turn of events, as Parker has put it, the question of Ôpersonal 
improvement takes the place of social transformation, and the psychologisation of social 
life É [ends up] encourage[ing] people to think that the only possible change they 
could ever make would be in the way they dress and present themselves to others.Õ 
(Parker 2007)  
 
The state that comes into being in this context is not, for these reasons, a rational entity, 
interested purely in solving problems and attaining goals. The state is instead an 
affective sounding board, yet one constrained by market logics and with this unable to 
ensure long-lasting forms of political affiliation (Chatterjee 2004). This banalisation of 
politics implies a forgetting of the density and cohesion required by social 
transformation, or of the services and provisions that used to connect people with the 
state (Marshall 1992). Smallness, marginality and flimsiness do not create a very 
suitable ground on which to build either the present or possible different futures. 
Importantly, as these agonies expand to the (South of the) North and global inequality 
hits even harder in (the South of the) South, this marginality and flimsiness are 
becoming the predicaments of peripheries right across the world today. 
 
Labour opportunities, as in the Jvenes sin Fronteras programme, are therefore 
extremely important. They are a way to connect people to the ÔworldÕ, changing their 
lives in a fundamental way. Giving young people effective channels through which to 
take control of their lives beyond the realities already in reach is a way of caring for 
their emotional well-being. Sadly, however, the jobs offered by Jvenes sin Fronteras 
are not only limited and dependent on the existence of this programme, but labour as 
such is disappearing at an astonishing rate (Ferguson 2015). On the other hand, being 
the object of purely affective attention is not only financially savvy from a governance 
point of view but it can also help young people value themselves and feel valued. It also 
helps those working with them, for example educadores and enlaces, to establish the 
rapport needed to get in contact with them. However, in a certain way it also 
depoliticizes everyone involved. The young people we engaged with in Cali, in 
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particular those still waiting for one of the Jvenes sin Fronteras job opportunities, 
spend their days waiting for the state to bring the effective entitlements they needed. 
They hang around on neighbourhood corners passing time, disconnected in sport 
facilities, bored in training sessions, perhaps still engaged or thinking to engage in 
crime. The Ôpetty criminalÕ and young people at risk who are involved in Security and 
Development programmes can be seen, in this sense, as post-citizens of a certain kind: 
individuals who should be cared for but whose needs cannot be fully taken into account 
(Lefranc 2017, 140-144). Meanwhile, Educadores and enlaces agonise about the 
situation of the young people under their supervision, and the city residents continue to 
panic given CaliÕs ongoing insecurity. All of this occurs, of course, as life is becoming 
yet further securitized by the still significant amount of resources that continue to be 
spent by companies and residents and by the local administration on new surveillance 
technologies and police salaries and infrastructure. In this complex interaction between 
the petty subjects, the petty state and its petty laws, vulnerability is managed in such a 
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